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This paper attempts to elucidate key themes in feminist economics that are 
relevant to major concerns in behavioral economics, including gender 
differences in risk aversion. It makes use of the Institutional Analysis and 
Design (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues to 
organize this discussion. The paper examines how ideas about the structure and 
influence of mental models relate to a feminist critique of the standard methods 
used in studies of sex-based differences in behavior. It also argues that the 
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Feminist economics can be characterised as pluralist in a very broad sense: 
different ontological approaches are accommodated, in addition to a wide range 
of research methods. It is not unusual to see reference to ‘feminisms’, rather than 
‘feminism’, and these words themselves are telling of the nature of pluralism 
within feminist economics. However, there is now a large enough volume of 
feminist economic research to identify a number of its key themes and concerns. 
Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson outline these in their introduction to the 10 
year retrospective “Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man”, noting 
that feminist economics is distinctive in the serious attention it gives to women, 
its challenging of the common confusion of gender and sex, and its challenging of 
the economics discipline in masculine-only terms (Ferber and Nelson, 2003: 1-2). 
They highlight the social construction of both economic behavior and the 
contemporary discipline of economics. 
 
This paper attempts to elucidate these themes in feminist economics in a 
different (and potentially controversial) way. It makes use of the Institutional 
Analysis and Design (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and her 
colleagues, although this framework is most commonly associated with new 
institutional, rather than feminist economics.  Whilst this ‘cross-discipline’ 
approach produces some tensions (as are noted below), it is reflective of feminist 
economics’ ideals of open inquiry and its understanding of the importance of an 
atmosphere tolerant of potentially transformative critique (Barker, 1999: 326). 
Indeed, these ideals were emphasised in the opening article of the first issue of 
Feminist Economics, when Diane Strassman (1995: 1) asserted that  “We take the 
position that …gatekeeping, limiting scholarly conversation to those with similar 
backgrounds and training, produces knowledge that is less rich, representative, 
and useful.”  
 
The IAD approach was selected to structure this discussion of feminist economics 
because the framework incorporates the concept of situated actors, and this 
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relates closely to one feminist economics’ central themes: that economic behavior 
is gendered. The IAD framework allows us to trace out the various ways that 
men’s and women’s behavior is shaped by socially learned expectations and 
behaviors associated with being male or female. This is particularly useful for the 
analysis of observed sex-based differences in behavior, a field of research where 
the interests of many behavioral and feminist economists appear to intersect.  
 
The IAD framework was also chosen because some of its key components relate 
to particular shared interests of feminist and smart behavioral economics, 
including the influence of mental models on individuals’ processing information. 
This paper includes a discussion of how ideas about the structure and influence of 
mental models relate to a feminist critique of the standard methods used in 
studies of sex-based differences in behavior. In doing so it highlights a further 
important theme in feminist economics, that science is a socially constructed 
activity, with the social location, status and gender of scientists and scientific 
communities all playing a significant role in determining the methods and 
practices of science (Barker, 1999: 325). 
 
As a meta-theoretical framework, the IAD also has the advantage of facilitating 
comparisons of different theories and models. This helps us identify some of the 
particular features of feminist economics, in comparison with other theoretical 
traditions in economics, including mainstream economics. Toward the end of this 
paper the discussion focuses on the feminist economics’ critique of the 
separate/soluble dichotomy in mainstream economics, whereby individuals in 
market situations are assumed to be atomized, self-interested, with exogenously 
determined preferences, whilst individuals in family situations are characterized 
as connected to each other, altruistic and engaged in a process of shaping 
preferences. Feminist economists have identified several problems associated 
with this dichotomy, including barriers to the economic analysis of the unique 
aspects of women’s lives. Reflecting one of feminist economics’ basic aims – of 
addressing the realities of women’s lives and their economic and other 
contributions (Harding, 1999: 131), an alternative concept is thus advanced: that 
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of ‘individuals-in-relation’. The paper argues that this concept has the potential 
to guide future empirical and theoretical studies of men’s and women’s economic 
behavior. 
 
Some prominent feminist economists have already identified the strategic 
potential to link new institutional economics, which is Ostrom’s field, with 
feminist theory. Paula England and Nancy Folbre (2003: 62), for example, note 
the relevance of concepts such as endogenous tastes and reciprocity, which 
feature in new institutional (and smart behavioral) analysis, to notions about the 
gendered nature of economic behavior. However, many feminist economists 
contest other core concepts of new institutional and smart behavioral economics, 
such as the notion of boundedly rational economic agents.  Julie Nelson (2003a 
and 2003b), for example, emphasizes the emotional and subjective aspects of 
decision-making. 
  
Acknowledging these tensions, this paper aims to further explore the potential 
connections between feminist, smart behavioral and new institutional economics. 
The organization of the paper reflects these aims. The following section provides 
a brief introduction to the IAD framework. This is followed with a summary of 
the key features of feminist economics. Section 4 turns to a key research topic 
where the interests of feminist and behavioral economists appear to intersect, 
namely the presence (or otherwise) of differences in the preferences and behavior 
of men and women. Section 5 explores the issue of (possible) differences in risk 
aversion in some detail, whilst Section 6 considers the issue of altruistic 
preferences. Section 7 brings the discussion to a close with a summary of the key 
themes of feminist economics and some recommendations for smart behavioral 
economic research. 
2. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
 
The IAD framework is closely linked to the life work of Elinor Ostrom, the first 
(and thus far the only) woman to be awarded the Nobel Prize in economics. 
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Ostrom described the IAD as a multi-level taxonomy of the universal components 
(organized in many layers) that are relevant to regularized social behavior 
(including interactions in markets, hierarchies and other situations). 
 
The broad features of the IAD framework are summarised in the following 
diagram. Of prime importance is the idea of an action arena. This is a ‘social 
space’ within which “participants with diverse preferences interact, exchange 
good and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight." (Ostrom, 
2005: 14) The focus of IAD analysis tends to be on how the interaction between 
participants in different action situations is affected by the characteristics of the 
situation itself, including the characteristics of the participants and their 
positions, preferences, levels of information, approaches to information 
processing, possible actions and potential payoffs. 
 
As the diagram indicates, interactions within situations lead to particular 
outcomes, which may be desirable or undesirable. The framework incorporates 
feedback loops, to account for the way in which participants may respond to these 
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outcomes by engaging in efforts to either change or reinforce the structure of the 
arena (as indicated by the line at the bottom of the diagram). 
  
An important feature of IAD framework is its emphasis of the context of each 
action situation. Each action situation is understood to be 'located' within an 
action arena that is affected by a range of exogenous variables, including the 
attributes of the bio-physical world, the structure of the more general community 
(including the values generally accepted and the prevailing gender norms within 
the community), and the current set of rules in use, which will reflect the arena’s 
historical context.  
 
Some aspects of Ostrom’s work address the role of culture in shaping the mental 
models used by boundedly rational participants in different action situations. 
Ostrom (2005: 106-7) highlights how the cultural environment, including its 
prevailing gender norms, shapes participants’ perceptions of what actions are 
possible, legitimate and desirable (or preferred), and it coordinates the actions of 
groups of participants. She also asserts that, because mental models are affected 
by culture, they are likely to be transmitted across generations, producing 
stability in patterns of behavior and outcomes over time. However, in Ostrom’s 
analysis, mental models can change/are not constant. Factors such as vividness 
and salience can be relevant to the type of model that is adopted and can be a 
source of change or difference in participants’ perceptions and actions (Ostrom, 
2005: 108) 
3. Feminist Economics 
 
The IAD can be used to explain key features of feminist economics. Feminist 
economics can be distinguished especially from mainstream economics by its 
concern for the influence of the contextual environment on the preferences, 
possible actions, payoffs and outcomes for men and women in market and family 
situations. The ‘situated’ nature of economic behavior is a fundamental concept 
in feminist economics. Informed by feminist philosophy of science, feminist 
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economics considers how individuals’ [participants’] economic power, 
obligations, goals, interests and, ultimately, their economic outcomes, are 
affected by their social roles and relationships, and how these, in turn, are 
affected by their ascribed social identities, including their gender, race, sexual 
orientation, and ethnicity. 
 
As its name suggests, feminist economics pays particular attention to the 
gendered nature of the contextual environment – and its implications for men’s 
and women’s economic roles, actions and outcomes. Gender is distinguished 
from sex, or the biological differences between males and females c . It is 
understood that societies or communities assign different roles, norms, and 
meanings to men and women and their actions. For example, in most societies 
individuals are assigned to distinct social roles based on their gender (such as 
men to ‘breadwinner’ and women to ‘caregiver’ within the family). Men and 
women are also expected to comply with different norms of behavior (for 
example, men are expected to be brave, and women modest). Furthermore, 
psychological traits of masculinity and femininity are linked to gender norms (for 
example, women are considered virtuous if they comply with a norm of modesty 
but assertiveness can be considered a vice). 
 
Using the language of the IAD, a community’s gender norms affect various 
elements of the action arenas that men and women participate in. The norms 
influence the ability of men and women to participate in particular situations, the 
positions that they can take up within these situations, the range and nature of 
their possible actions, their access to information – and, potentially, the way they 
process this information, their payoffs from different actions, and arguably most 
importantly the quality of their outcomes. In turn, the gendered distribution of 
economic outcomes is likely to be reflected in patterns of action at various levels 
                                                        
c Increasingly, the analysis acknowledges multiple genders. This takes into account 
individuals whose gender identity differs from their biological sex. 
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of the social hierarchy aimed at either entrenching existing norms, or challenging 
them. 
 
The way in which these perspectives have influenced the feminist economic 
analysis of economic behavior and outcomes can be illustrated with examples 
relating to the labour market. Feminist economic analysis of occupational choice 
have focused on the impact of social structures and relationships on women and 
men’s work and career goals (Pujol, 1997; Strassman, 1997). Studies of the gender 
pay gap have explored the influence of social norms associated with providing 
care on the distribution of unpaid household work and, subsequently, on the 
gendered nature and configuration of work (Folbre, 1994). Other studies have 
examined the failure of apparently gender-neutral market institutions to 
adequately value the commodities produced by women (Himmelweit, 1995; 
Ironmonger,1996).  
 
Importantly, feminist economics’ emphasis on the social construction of behavior 
and outcomes has also influenced its relationship with the discipline of 
economics. Feminist economists have identified the influence of a range of 
gender norms and cultural biases on [using the language of the IAD] the action 
situations associated with the development and perpetuation of economic theory. 
These include the tendency for “culturally ‘masculine’ topics, such as men and 
market behavior, and culturally ‘masculine’ characteristics, such as autonomy, 
abstraction, and logic…[to] define the field.” (Ferber and Nelson, 2003:1) It is 
important to note that feminist economics challenges these definitions of 
economics – and devotes energy to exposing the biases in the discipline, in 
addition to focusing on ensuring that the lives and experiences of women feature 
in economic analysis, and attempting to remedy the common confusion of gender 
with sex.  
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4. Feminist Economics and the Analysis of Observed Differences in 
the Preferences and Behavior of Men and Women 
 
As can be anticipated, given the description provided in the above paragraphs, 
feminist economics’ analysis of observed differences in preferences and behaviors 
of men and women is distinguished by its focus on their social origins. Observed 
differences in the preferences and behavior between men and women are, thus, 
often the starting point of inquiry (into their origins), rather than the end point of 
an investigation of (apparent) differences in the ‘natures’ of men and women.  
 
Feminist economics’ focus on the social origins of observed differences in the 
preferences and behavior of men and women reflects an argument that 
preferences and behavior are gendered. For example, boys and girls in most 
communities are socialized into particular behavioral patterns; trained to 
different norms of bodily comportment from an early age. Gender norms in 
Western societies tend to emphasise physicality, aggression and indifference for 
boys and constraint for girls and, as a result, men and women are likely to find 
different types of behavior comfortable and achievable with a degree of fluidity. 
Performing the gendered actions might feel “natural”, be associated with positive 
“payoffs”, and result in positive “outcomes”. On the other hand, performing 
actions that are typically assigned to the opposite sex might illicit a sense of 
novelty, self-consciousness, and awkwardness [negative payoffs and outcomes 
that are evaluated as poor]. There are also important feedback effects, with the 
experience of poor/good performance influencing the incentive to invest in 
gendered skills.  
 
Gendered socialization can also cause differences in the way men and women 
process information about a similar situation or arena. This is because 
representational schemes that are functional for different gender roles can make 
different kinds of information salient. For example, in traditional domestic 
settings, women may notice dirt that men don't, “… not because women have a 
specially sensitive sensory apparatus…[but] because they have a role which 
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designates the females of the household as the ones who have to clean 
up.“(Anderson, 2009: 9) 
 
These processes may also result in cognitive styles that differ between men and 
women. For example, the tendency for men to be allocated positions associated 
with political and economic power that require detachment and control may 
encourage a cognitive style that is abstract, theoretical, disembodied, emotionally 
detached and analytical. The tendency for women to be assigned positions 
associated with the provision of care may encourage a cognitive style that is 
concrete, practical, embodied, relational and emotionally engaged. (England, 
2003: 36-8) 
 
Patterns of value are also gendered. There is a cultural tendency in most 
communities to link psychological traits considered ‘masculine’ with virtue when 
demonstrated by men, and ‘feminine’ traits with virtue when women 
demonstrate them. This influences the payoffs from different actions that can be 
performed by men and women and creates incentives for individuals to comply 
with prevailing gender norms.  In academic work situations, for example, the 
quest for “masculine” prestige may encourage the continued use of “masculine” 
methods by men, and a rejection of methods associated with femininity or 
female-dominated fields of enquiryd (Nelson 1992, 1996, 2003c) More generally, 
the material and other payoffs associated with different jobs or career paths can 
vary depending on whether the tasks entailed in the occupational role align with 
the individual’s gender. For example, men might perceive costs associated with 
their participation in types of work regarded as ‘feminine’, such as childcare; and 
women might attach costs to their involvement in types of work regarded as 
masculine, such as mining. 
 
                                                        
d Julie Nelson (1993) notes how the term hard is often metaphorically attached to 
mathematical and quantitative analysis, and seen as positive and masculine. In contrast, 
the term soft is attached to qualitative methods, is used as a pejorative, and is 
associated with femininity. 
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The gendered distribution of power between men and women in many action 
arenas is an additional important influence on behavior and outcomes. It can 
cause ‘masculine’ actions to be valorized in particular privileged situations and 
women’s ability to participate in these situations to be limited. In academic 
situations, for example, the historical dominance of men has resulted in several 
formal and informal institutions that value (and thus produce positive payoffs 
for) ‘masculine’ forms of work and contributions to knowledge. The formal 
institutions include promotion criteria that emphasise a track record of journal 
publications and research grants. Often these criteria can only be satisfied by 
academics who are able to commit long work hours and have uninterrupted 
tenure, especially in their thirties. Gender differences (and inequity) in outcomes 
arise if men who conform to a traditional breadwinner role have some ability to 
achieve success in these situations, whilst other men and the many women who 
take on direct care roles in their families, find it difficult to achieve positive 
outcomes.  
 
Finally, commonly held ideas about gender affect our perceptions of others (and 
their actions). A number of studies have demonstrated that the gender of a 
person affects the costs, benefits and probabilities that others assign to their 
actions (see, for example, Kahneman, 2003). Barbara Reskin (2003), for 
example, highlighted how in employment situations managers might 
unconsciously attach certain behaviors, such as reliability or competitiveness to 
particular individuals because of their gender. Whilst the managers might 
consciously reject discrimination, their tendency to rely on familiar social 
categories might still cause them to think and ultimately act in ways that privilege 
individuals with a particular gender and disadvantage others. Paula England’s, 
Michelle Budig’s and Nancy Folbre’s (2002) analysis of the labour market 
outcomes of care workers has similar themes, highlghting how women are 
commonly perceived to be ‘naturally’ able to accomplish the work involved in 
caring for children, and for sick and elderly people. This is consequential because 
it tends to result in judgments of care work as something that does not require 
skill or effort, contributing to the low wage outcomes of the many women 
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engaged in care work (see also Austen and Jefferson, 2014).  
5. Feminist Economics and Studies of Sex-based Differences in 
Attitudes to Risk 
 
We can consider now how feminist economists engage with the growing body of 
literature on sex-based differences in preferences and behavior. An important 
part of this literature deals with differences in the risk aversion of men and 
women. Much of it has been motivated by concern about evidence of an over-
representation of women in relatively low risk forms of assets and in particular 
occupations. This section provides an overview of these studies before 
introducing a critical perspective – informed by feminist economics – on the 
common conclusion that women are more risk averse than men. 
 
Studies of sex-based differences in risk preference have featured both studies of 
investment and insurance decision-making in the presence of risk and lottery or 
gamble experiments of risk taking. Studies in the first group have used pension 
fund data to study the allocation of assets between investment options associated 
with different levels of risk.  
 
Studies in the latter group have included gamble experiments with student 
participants. They have typically focused on whether (and to what degree) the 
willingness to take a gamble or invest in a lottery is affected by the level of risk 
involved. Reflecting the acknowledged importance of both risk and loss aversion, 
many of these experiments have include scenarios where the possible outcomes 
are framed in terms of gains, whilst others are framed in terms of losses. 
Understandably, the analysis of sex-based differences has focused on the 
magnitude and statistical significance of observed differences in the choices of 
male and female participants. Commonly the studies have incorporated controls 
for other factors that might be relevant to a person’s risk preference, such as age.  
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Several contextual environment experiments have involved students 
participating in computer-based simulated currency trading and stock market 
games (where the decision to enter particular currency markets or purchase 
particular securities involves risk).  Apart from testing for sex-based differences 
in risk preference, these studies also examine the effects of factors such as 
ambiguity about the game’s outcomes, knowledge of financial markets, and 
confidence in financial decision-making. A recent study by Alison Booth, Lina 
Cardona-Sosa and Patrick Nolen (2014: 128) compared risk preferences exhibited 
by participants in mixed versus same-sex groups. 
 
Cathrine Eckel’s and Philip Grossman’s (2008: 6-11) assessment is that neither 
the experimental nor the other studies provide conclusive evidence on the nature 
or extent of sex-based differences in risk preferences. Apparently this is “…is 
consistent with results from psychology, which tend to show differences in risk 
attitudes across environments for a given subject…” Booth et al. (2014) also 
conclude that attitudes to risk are influenced heavily by contextual factors. In 
their study, the female participants’ willingness to invest varied substantially 
across the same-sex and mixed group settings of their experiments.  
 
Despite the mixed evidence from studies of the issue, Eckel’s and Grossman’s 
(2008: 6) general summary of the results of the gamble experiments is that they 
“suggest greater risk aversion by women…” Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy (2009: 
448) are more strident, claiming from their review of the literature on gender 
differences in preferences that “women are indeed more risk averse than men."  
 
This is the starting point for an important review by prominent feminist 
economist Julie Nelson, who challenges the assumptions, methods and 
conclusions of behavioral studies of sex-differences in risk preferences. In her 
2012 paper “Are Women Really More Risk-Averse than Men?” Nelson reported 
the findings of a meta-analysis of published articles on the topic of sex and risk, 
including the studies canvassed by Croson and Gneezy (2009), Eckel and 
Grossman (2008), and Booth et al.’s more recent work. It examined the available 
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evidence on the quantitative magnitudes of the differences between the average 
level of risk aversion observed for men and women, and the extent to which the 
observed distribution of risk aversion varies between male and female samples. 
In doing so, Nelson attempted to redress the tendency for behavioral studies to 
rely on measures of statistical significance in their judgements of the significance 
of observed differences in the risk aversion of men and women: 
In the gender-and-risk literature, as in other literatures, however, 
judgments of "significant difference" are generally based on statistical 
significance alone. Discussions of the absolute size of the difference, much 
less its possible implications for society or policy, are rare (Nelson, 2012: 
6) 
 
Nelson’s ‘alternative’ approach to assessing the evidence on gender differences in 
risk preference produced some revealing insights. Only 25% of the studies that 
she reviewed identified a difference favouring lower male risk aversion of more 
than half a standard deviation. Only two studies found a difference of more than 
one standard deviation of difference. Four studies identified differences that are 
statistically significant in the direction of greater female risk taking.  
 
Thus, in Nelson’s assessment, an appropriate summary of the results of studies of 
sex differences in risk preference is that they point to "… a statistically significant 
difference in mean risk aversion between men and women, with women on 
average being more risk averse." (Nelson, 2012: 2)  This stands in important 
contrast to Croson’s and Gneezy’s (2009, 448) claim that “women are indeed 
more risk averse than men.” The latter statement implies that risk preference is a 
stable characteristic of people defined by their sex; and that a lower risk 
preference is universally true for every individual member of the class "women" 
(as compared to "men”).  As Nelson notes (2012: 3) , “this exceedingly strong 
implication is not likely intended by those who write such statements”, noting 
that “just one example of a cautious man and a bold woman disproves it.” 
However, she goes on to draw our attention to how the more probable meaning of 
the statement (that women are, or are disposed to be more risk averse by virtue of 
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being a woman) is also problematic. 
In the current example, the statement would imply that greater risk 
aversion is an essential characteristic of womanliness—or, by parallel 
reasoning, that greater risk seeking is an essential characteristic of 
manliness. (Nelson, 2012: 3-4) 
 
Reflecting themes in feminist economics introduced earlier, Nelson rejects the 
notion that risk aversion is a sex-linked “trait” and, instead, locates the source of 
observed sex-based differences in risk preferences in patterns of gendered 
socialization and power. As such, observed sex-differences should not be the end-
point of inquiries into risk preferences but, rather, the stimulus for further 
inquiry into the gendered norms and other institutions that influence men’s and 
women’s attitudes to risk. This potentially creates an important role for future 
studies of the issue in different cultural contexts. 
 
It is important to note that Nelson’s critique of the gender and risk literature also 
relates to another theme of feminist economics that was highlighted in earlier 
sections of this paper, namely its critical perspective on possible biases within the 
economics discipline. Nelson highlights the influence of mental models on the 
work of researchers; of how the inferences we derive from empirical data are 
likely to reflect “the structure of our inside worlds— that is, of evolved, 
developmental human cognition.” (Nelson, 2012: 5) She notes that the models 
that we use are significantly influenced by our experiences of and beliefs about 
men and women and, thus, perhaps, it is not surprising that many studies ‘leap’ 
from evidence of a statistically significant difference in average levels of risk 
aversion to conclusions about men’s and women’s natures.  In other words, 
researchers are (as are others) prone to "confirmation bias”, whereby we tend to 
more readily absorb information that conforms to our pre-existing beliefs, 
including our beliefs about the ‘nature’ of men and women. This can be an 
important (and potentially dangerous) source of distortion in our work.  For 
example, as Nelson points out, if we report a statistically significance in risk 
aversion that is not substantially significant we can reinforce common 
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stereotypes about men’s and women’s ‘natures.’ To the extent that this diverts 
attention from cultural and other institutional sources of differences in behavior, 
it can be an obstacle to the design of appropriate policy measures aimed at 
improved gender equity. In other words, there is a risk that research into sex-
based differences may contribute to the perpetuation of gender inequality, rather 
than help to reduce it. 
 
6. Feminist Economics and Studies of Altruism 
 
Similar themes are apparent in feminist economic analyses of altruism. A number 
of studies of differences in altruism between men and women have been 
undertaken, motivated by a sense that they could lead to different patterns of 
charitable giving, bargaining, and household decision-making. As such, gender 
differences in altruism are potentially consequential for outcomes across a 
number of different market and family situations. In their 2008 paper “Altruism 
in individual and joint-giving decisions: what’s gender got to do with it?”, Linda 
Kamas, Anne Preston and Sandy Baum reviewed the experimental evidence on 
sex-based differences in altruism, and contributed the findings of their own study 
of the issue. The first part of this section draws heavily on their summary of the 
relevant literature. Broader feminist economic perspectives on the topic of 
altruism are considered in the latter part of this section. Here the focus of the 
discussion turns away from the question of whether women are more/less 
altruistic than men and toward the general importance attached to altruistic (and 
other other-regarding) preferences by feminist economists. 
 
As Kamas, Preston and Baum (2008) describe, experimental studies of altruism 
typically assess participants’ willingness to sacrifice their own outcomes to 
improve the well-being of another either by using a dictator, ultimatum, public 
good or investment/trust game. The authors favour a dictator ‘game’, where the 
dictator decides how to allocate a sum of money between himself/herself and 
another player, on the grounds that it has the greatest ability to separate the 
 17 
effects of altruistic preferences on behavior from the effect of risk and 
competition. In their dictator games, the recipient of the money is a charity.  
 
Kamas, Preston and Baum (2008) report findings from their own experiments 
that indicate significant gender differences in altruistic behavior, with women 
giving significantly more, on average, than men. Their finding was generally 
suggestive of a pattern of difference similar to that observed by James Andreoni 
and Lise Vesterland (2001: 293). However, several studies included in their 
review, such as those by Martin Dufwenberg and Astri Muren (2006) reported 
higher levels of generosity by men. Kamas, Preston and Baum (2008: 25) 
conclude that in the experimental literature there is no consensus on the 
statistical significance of gender differences in altruistic behavior.  
 
The explanation offered for the mixed-results on altruistic preferences by Kamas, 
Preston and Baum (2008: 25) centres on the differences in the experimental 
settings of the various studies. These differences relate to both the type of game 
used, as well as “…the experimental design or context, …the framing of the 
experiment, the degree of anonymity, the subject population, and/or the manner 
in which the participants are chosen." Whether men or women are identified as 
the “more generous sex” apparently varies with the price of giving, the degree of 
anonymity, and the possibility of reciprocity (see also Cox and Deck, 2006). 
Several studies conclude that the gender of the recipient of an altruistic act also 
affects gift-giving. The study conducted by Kamas, Preston and Baum (2008) 
found that gift-giving increased in mixed-sex team situations, and especially 
when the participants were able to negotiate a common gift.  
 
Kamas, Preston and Baum (2008: 44) acknowledge (albeit in a footnote) that 
they do not provide an in-depth explanation of the causes of observed sex-based 
differences in altruism. However, they do allude to a number of influences 
stemming from the social environment, and these are potentially reflective of the 
processes of gendered socialization that were noted in earlier sections of this 
paper. For example, their explanation for the observation of higher levels of gift-
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giving by mixed-sex teams includes a role for social information (about the social 
norm for gift-giving) and social image (a desire to be considered favourably by 
others) (Kamas, Preston and Baum, 2008: 27). As a reviewer of their paper 
apparently observed, it may also be possible that women are socialized to be 
more giving than men, and women’s identification as mothers or caregivers may 
lead to altruistic acts (Kamas, Preston and Baum, 2008: 45). The authors also 
acknowledge the possibility that as experiments of this type are conducted 
beyond the confines of the current set of developed Western countries, the 
impacts of cultural and sociological forces on gender differences in altruism will 
become more apparent. 
 
The interpretation of experimental evidence offered by Kamas, Preston and 
Baum contrasts that provided by James Andreoni and Lise Vesterland (2001). 
The latter appear to succumb to the various pitfalls involved in assessing sex-
based differences in behavior that were noted by Julie Nelson. They infer from 
their experimental evidence [of a statistically significant gender difference in the 
observed levels of gift giving across 142 students in eight experimental settings] 
that “ … when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is cheap, men 
are more altruistic.” (Andreoni and Vesterland, 2001: 293) The focus of their 
results is on the statistical significance of observed differences in means, rather 
than on the magnitude of these differences or the distribution of results. Their 
study ‘essentialises’ the nature of men and women, reinforces common 
stereotypes, and fails to acknowledge the preferences of men and women who 
don’t conform to group averages. It provides no insights into the possible sources 
of observed gender differences in altruism, and its discussion of policy 
implications is limited to a consideration of the consequences of gender 
differences in charitable gift giving and restaurant tipping.  
 
A more important feminist economic discussion of altruism shifts the focus of 
attention away from possible sex-based differences and toward the general 
importance of altruistic preferences (for men and women). This discussion forms 
part of a broader critique of the theoretical structure of mainstream economics by 
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feminist economics. The critique argues against a narrow specification of the 
sources of individual motivation and argues instead for specifications that take 
account of various sources of motivation, including altruistic preferences, and the 
social influence on these motives. 
 
The critique of mainstream economic theory, developed by Paula England (see, 
for example, England, 2003) focuses, first, on its assumption that individuals in 
market situations are atomized, self-interested, and have preferences no one can 
change. This is contrasted against the assumption that individuals in family 
situations are connected to each other, with inter-dependent preferences and 
engaged in a process of shaping the preferences and values of the young. As 
England explains, whilst the theory’s analysis of market situations features a 
‘separative’ view of the self that presumes, amongst other things, that individuals 
lack sufficient emotional connection to others to feel any empathy – or to be 
altruistic, a ‘soluble’ self is assumed in its analysis of family situations, allowing 
both empathy and altruism to influence behavior and outcomes. 
 
England (2003: 36-40) highlights the various problems with this theoretical 
structure. These include problems caused by incorrectly assuming pure self-
interest in market situations, and by over-emphasising the extent of empathy and 
altruism in family situations. Additional problems arise from the 
separative/soluble dichotomy and its relationship to gender dichotomies in 
western thought. England notes that in simple (sexist) formulations of western 
thought, men are seen as naturally separative, autonomous and individuated, 
whilst women are seen as naturally soluble, connected and yielding. Separation 
has been valorized in western thought, at least for men, whilst connectedness has 
been devalued. As a consequence, writing in economics and other fields has 
“failed to recognize that men are not entirely autonomous….whilst women’s 
nurturing work was taken for granted and excluded from…theory.” (England, 
2003: 38)  
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These observations link to several of the themes of the feminist critique of 
mainstream economics noted in earlier sections of this paper. For example, the 
valorizing of separation – and market situations – has contributed to a failure to 
adequately recognize the experiences and contributions of women. The gendered 
nature of the separative/soluble dichotomy helps to explain common confusion 
of gender with sex; of the tendency to identify ‘essential’ differences between men 
and women. 
 
Feminist economic analysis suggests that it is appropriate to assume that both 
male and female participants in market and family situations will have both 
“separative” and “connective” qualities; and that these qualities will have both 
positive and negative aspects. Core concepts, therefore, are of “individuals-in-
relation” or “relational autonomy” (England, 2003: 39). 
 
These concepts have obvious relevance for the feminist economic analysis of 
altruism (and for the analysis of the related concepts of cooperation and strong 
reciprocity). Altruism is potentially relevant to the preferences and behaviors of 
men and women. It should be considered as a source of motivation in market and 
other situations. There is a need for more theoretical and empirical studies of 
men’s and women’s altruistic (and other other-regarding) preferences. We need 
additional insights to how these preferences interact with other preferences, 
including self-regarding preferences; how they are shaped; and how they are 
influenced by different aspects of the contextual environment, such as general 
levels of altruism in the surrounding community. Taking this approach, studies of 
gender difference in altruism would ideally focus on women’s traditional 
association with the family sphere; how, therefore, they have been traditionally 
assumed/expected to be altruistic; and the consequences of these 
assumptions/expectations for their observed behavior and their economic 
outcomes.  
 
This approach features in Nancy Folbre’s (1995) analysis of caring labour, a topic 
that calls into question the role and impact of altruistic preferences and which 
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also has relevance for a range of important policy issues, including the future 
quality and cost of child and elder care, and pay equity.  
 
Folbre highlights that caring relies on a range of motivations, including 
reciprocity, altruism and responsibility. She also emphasizes that these 
motivations are constructed in a social environment. Folbre recognizes that 
caring labour is associated with tasks that women often specialize in, such as 
mothering. However, she also emphasizes that caring labour can (and is) 
undertaken both men and women, and that it occurs in both family and market 
situations. 
 
Folbre is particularly concerned with the interactions between the different 
sources of motivation for caring labour. She acknowledges the role of altruism 
but notes that it interacts with long-run reciprocity and the fulfillment of 
obligation or responsibility. As such, she describes carers as being both 
“connected” (through their altruistic preferences) and “separate” (in their 
concern for their individual payoffs). In Folbre’s analysis, individuals may 
provide care out of a sense of affection or responsibility for others, but their 
motivation to care is likely to also be influenced by long-run expectations of 
reciprocity of either tangible or emotional services. Care motives are also 
described as being dependent, in part at least, on the level of altruism and 
reciprocity within the surrounding community. In turn, social norms are ascribed 
a potential role in helping prevent a coordination (or caring) failure.  
 
Folbre accounts for gender differences in caring labour in a variety ways. First, 
social norms, as well as notions of obligation, are gendered. As such, they result 
in a different structure of payoffs for men and women involved in caring and 
other roles. The historical context is also important, with women’s traditional 
roles in caring for others potentially affecting the nature and extent of their 
altruistic ‘preferences’ and, thus, their evaluation of caring and other roles. 
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The outcomes from caring situations, described by Folbre, are often not positive 
for women. Caring labour is typically low paid and aspects of the work – 
including the responsibility, skill and effort involved are not generally reflected in 
wage and other outcomes. Given that at least part of the motivation for caring 
labour is self-interested, the low wages place at risk the ongoing supply of care. 
An appropriate policy response to this dilemma would be to improve the ‘rate of 
return’ from caring labour, regulating wage outcomes to ensure that low wages do 
not crowd out care motives. 
 
The contrast between Folbre’s analysis of caring labour and that offered by 
mainstream economists is stark. The latter tend to rely on the notion of non-
pecuniary preferences, which are typically ‘lumped together’ and modeled as 
exogenously (and, presumably, biologically) determined. The independent 
determination of motivation in these models results in a prediction that if an 
individual gains positive utility from caring he/she will be willing to trade-off 
lower wages to ‘indulge’ this preference. Wage regulation is rejected on the 
assumption of the absence of social or other barriers to mobility. Indeed, in some 
analyses, higher wages for carers are viewed as a threat to caring labour – based 
on a belief that higher wages would encourage the participation of individuals 
with less altruistic preferences (Heyes, 2005). 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to convey key themes in feminist economics of 
relevance to smart behavioral economists. It took a novel approach to this task by 
structuring the discussion using concepts and terms drawn from the Institutional 
Analysis and Design framework, developed by Elinor Ostrom. The framework 
was used to identify the distinctive features of feminist economics, including, 
perhaps most importantly, the emphasis it places on understanding the social 
influences on individual preferences, actions and outcomes. The ‘situated’ nature 
of economic behavior is a fundamental concept in feminist economics. Feminist 
economics pays particular attention to how individuals’ economic power, 
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obligations, goals, interests and, ultimately, their economic outcomes, are 
affected by their social roles and relationships, and how these, in turn, are 
affected by their ascribed social identities, including their gender. Gender is 
distinguished from sex, or an individual’s biological identity of being male or 
female. It refers to socially learned expectations and behaviors associated with 
being male or female.  
 
The paper has highlighted the various ways in which the concept of a ‘situated 
actor’ influences feminist economists’ engagement with topics in behavioral 
economics. It has demonstrated that feminist economists tend to take a cautious 
approach to the analysis of observed differences in behavior between men and 
women. Whilst feminist economists do not deny that these differences exist, they 
emphasise the need to explore their sources in the social environment, and they 
sound a strong warning about the dangers of drawing inferences about the 
essential ‘natures’ of men and women from these differences.  
 
The concept of a situated actor is also apparent in feminist economists’ 
perspectives on the theories and methods used in the analysis of economic 
behavior. The paper highlighted the feminist perspective that academic inquiry 
itself is a fundamentally social process. As such, participants in academic work 
situations are subject to biases that arise from their own (essentially limited) set 
of experiences, including their experiences of and beliefs about men and women. 
This can be an important source of error in academic work, potentially 
contributing to a reinforcement of stereotypes about men and women, rather 
than promoting greater gender equity. An important concern of feminist 
economists is to minimize these sources of error by training economists and 
promoting the adoption and enforcement of methodological principles designed 
to check the influence of gender bias.  
 
The paper also emphasized the feminist economics’ critique of the 
separate/soluble dichotomy in mainstream economics. The mainstream 
assumption is that individuals in market situations are “separate”, that is, 
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essentially atomized, self-interested, with preferences no one can change. In 
contrast, this theory assumes that individuals in family situations are “soluble”, 
that is, connected to each other, with inter-dependent preferences, and engaged 
in a process of shaping the preferences and values of the young. The critique 
observes that the separate/soluble dichotomy that characterizes mainstream 
economics has a strong gender dimension, with market situations commonly 
associated with the activities of men, whilst family situations are commonly 
linked to the activities of women. This has various negative impacts, including the 
tendency for the lives and experiences of many women to be excluded from 
economic analysis, and the “essentialising” of men’s and women’s natures [“men 
are self-interested and autonomous, whilst women are caring and dependent”]. 
The approach has limited the analysis of the range of motivations [self-interested 
and other-regarding] affecting the behaviors of men and women in market and 
family situations.  
 
Feminist economics offers an alternative concept to guide future empirical and 
theoretical studies of behavior: that of ‘individuals-in-relation’. This conveys that 
men and women, in market and non-market situations, are likely to be influenced 
by self-interested and other-regarding preferences. The recommendation is for 
smart behavioral economists to pursue studies of how different sources of 
motivation interact with each other; how they are shaped; and how they are 
influenced by different aspects of the contextual environment, such as general 
levels of altruism or reciprocity in the surrounding community. Further studies of 
gender differences in behavior are needed, but they should focus on how, for 
example, prevailing gender norms affect the positions men and women can 
participate in, the payoffs and value attached their alternative actions, and, 
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